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"THE CONSTITUTION IS WHAT THE JUDGES SAY IT IS."
BY JAMES E. LEAHY
I. INTRODUCTION
The title of this article is part of a statement made by United
States Supreme Court Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes when
he was Governor of New York. The complete statement reads as
follows: "We are under a Constitution but the Constitution is what
the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty
and of our property under the Constitution."1
In his statement, Governor Hughes was saying that constitu-
tions are merely words on paper until given substance by judicial
decisions interpreting them. This article examines what the jus-
tices of the North Dakota Supreme Court have been saying about
certain sections of the State Constitution Declaration of Rights
since the beginning of statehood in 1889. The supreme court's
decisions interpreting each of the sections have been analyzed and
the cases in which the court has made important pronouncements
are discussed. It is hoped that the article will be of assistance to
practitioners when dealing with current State constitutional issues.
While some of the rights protected by the sections discussed
herein are similar to those guaranteed by the provisions of the first
ten amendments to the United States Constitution (Bill of Rights),
there are significant differences in language. Also, the Declaration
of Rights contains some provisions not found in the Federal Bill of
Rights. These differences will become evident as the various sec-
tions of the Declaration are discussed.
Sections 1 through 5, section 7, and section 9 of the Declara-
tion are examined herein. It is anticipated that the other sections
will be discussed in future articles.
II. ARTICLE I
A. SECTION 1.
All individuals are by nature equally free and independent
f Professor Emeritus, California Western School of Law, San Diego, CA; Member,
State Bar Association of North Dakota; JD, University of North Dakota 1949; Order of Coff;
LLM, New York University 1967. Practiced law in Fargo, ND, 1949-56; Managing Officer,
Trust Department, The Merchants National Bank and Trust Company, Fargo, ND, 1956-64;
Member, North Dakota State House of Representatives, 1963-64; Professor, California
Western School of Law, San Diego, CA, 1964-85.
1. M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 204 (1963).
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and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining safety
and happiness; and to keep and bear arms for the defense of their
person, family, property, and the state, and for lawful hunting, rec-
reational, and other lawful purposes, which shall not be infringed.'
Section 1 contains a general declaration of the inherent rights
of humankind similar to that contained in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. With the exception of its interpretation of the word
"liberty," the North Dakota Supreme Court has not found this sec-
tion to be a repository of specific constitutional rights. In referring
to sections 1 and 123 the court has stated:
We will consider these two sections together because
the second supplements and supports the first which
defines and declares the inherent rights of men, while the
second protects and guarantees the exercise and enjoy-
ment of those rights. Thus it follows that there cannot be
a violation of section 1 unless there be also a violation of
section 13 (12).'
The first judicial construction of section 1 was in State ex rel
Goodsil v. Woodmanse,5 an 1890 case in which a person was
charged with "the alleged offense of doing business as an individ-
ual banker, contrary to' 6 state statutes which provided that the
business of banking could be carried on only by corporations. The
defendant argued that his "constitutional rights and personal lib-
erty, as secured... [by section 1] have been ruthlessly violated and
taken away"7 by the banking laws.
In recognizing that section 1 does give protection to personal
liberty, the court stated "it has been held that the provision rela-
tive to personal liberty found in our constitution might be violated
by the enactment of a statute which operated to deprive a citizen
of the right to pursue a lawful trade or avocation."" The court fur-
ther stated, however, that banking had always been subject to leg-
islative control and therefore the banking laws were
2. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. The section numbers used herein are those in use following the re-arrangement and
renumbering ordered by section 46-03-11.1 of the North Dakota Century Code.
4. State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 918 (1943). The section number in parentheses is
that presently in use.
5. 46 N.W. 970 (1890).
6. State ex rel Goodsil v. Woodmanse, 46 N.W. 970 (1890).
7. Id. at 970-71.




The court further analyzed section 1 of the Constitution in
State v. Cromwell.1" In Cromwell the defendant had been con-
victed of attempting to practice photography without a license."
He contended that the licensing laws violated sections 1, 12, and
21 of the Constitution."2 The court held that the licensing laws
were unconstitutional. 13 In so doing, it gave substantive content to
the word "liberty" in section 1.1' Quoting from the encyclopedia
American Jurisprudence, the court stated:
Thus liberty "includes the right of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
to pursue any livelihood or vocation and for that purpose
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, neces-
sary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. Within the meaning of the term
'liberty' is also included the right to buy and sell, to select
freely such tradesmen as the citizen himself may desire to
patronize, to manufacture, to acquire property, to live in
a community, to have a free and open market, the right of
free speech, of self-defense against unlawful violence,
and, in general, the opportunity to do those things which
are ordinarily done by free men."1
1 5
The court in Cromwell then analyzed the constitutionality of
the licensing laws by applying a reasonableness standard which
tests governmental infringement upon the liberty right to work in
9. Id. at 971. Subsequent decisions by the North Dakota Supreme Court further
defined section 1 of the Declaration of Rights. See, e.g., State v. Fargo Bottling Works Co.,
124 N.W. 387 (1910) (no violation of section 1 in state prohibition of liquor sales); Cofman v.
Ousterhous, 168 N.W. 826 (1918) (no violation of section 1 in licensing of cream stations);
State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 170 N.W. 121 (1918) (no violation of section 1 in making it a
crime to act as an agent to bootleg liquor); State ex rel. City of Bismarck v. District Court in
and for Burleigh County, 253 N.W. 744 (N.D. 1934) (no violation of section 1 in licensing
plumbers); Bob Rosen Water Conditioning Co. v. City of Bismarck, 181 N.W.2d 722 (N.D.
1970) (no violation of section 1 in requiring water softener installers to secure a plumbing
license); State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 924, (1982) (no
violation of section 1 in requiring one to register before selling securities); Moody v. Hagen,
162 N.W. 704 (1917) (no right granted under section 1 to inherit by will); Tayloe v. City of
Wahpeton, 62 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1953) (no right granted under section 1 to collect garbage);
State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 924 (1982) (no right granted
under section 1 to use commercial paper).
10. 9 N.W.2d 914 (1943).
11. State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 915 (1943).
12. Id. at 916.
13. Id. at 922.
14. Id. at 918.
15. Id. at 918 (quoting 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 329 (1937)).
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any of the common occupations of life. 16 In concluding that the
photography licensing laws were unreasonable, the court com-
pared photography to the occupations of "the farmer, the store-
keeper, the carpenter, the machinist, the tailor, the actor, the
musician.' 1 7 There is as much reason, the court stated, "for requir-
ing a mental and moral examination preliminary to licensing those
who may engage in any of those occupations as there is for those
who engage in the business of photography, yet, who would main-
tain that such a requirement would be reasonable?"'" Hence, the
laws requiring photographers to be licensed were unreasonable
and, therefore, unconstitutional. 19
Although the court held in Cromwell that the word "liberty"
in section 1 of the Constitution includes the right to engage in the
occupation of one's choice, it is evident that this "right" is not
absolute. For example, in Johnson v. Elkin20 a law requiring house
movers to be licensed was challenged as a violation of sections 1,
12, and 21 of the North Dakota Constitution. 2' The court upheld
the licensing laws, finding that there "is no general constitutional
prohibition against legislation limiting entry into occupations or
professions."' 22 In reference to State v. Cromwell, the court stated:
We do not read State v. Cromwell, supra, as prohibit-
ing all restrictions on entry into a business or profession.
Such a reading would destroy a great deal of necessary
protection from incompetence, chicanery and corruption.
Many occupations are subject to licensing provisions, and
without a license it may be made criminal to engage in
them.23
The court noted that the only requirement to the licensing of
occupations is "whether the regulation, as to entry into the occu-
pation or profession or otherwise, is reasonable and, within consti-
tutional limits, promotes the order, safety, health, morals and
general welfare of society."
24
The Cromwell court recognized the existence of a constitu-
tional right to engage in the common occupations of life and found
16. Id. at 920-21.
17. Id. at 921.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 922.
20. 263 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1978).
21. Johnson v. Elkin, 263 N.W.2d 123, 124 (N.D. 1978).
22. Id. at 130.
23. Id. at 129.




it unreasonable to require a license for certain occupations. How-
ever, in Johnson, the court emphasized the need to license most, if
not all occupations and professions, and did not give a great deal of
weight to the fact that the court had previously found the word
"liberty" in section 1 to include the right to engage in the occupa-
tion of one's choice.
Justification for these differing views may be attributable to
the court's statement in Cromwell that one's rights pursuant to
section 1 are protected by the "due process clause" in section 12
and that there can be a violation of section 1 rights only if there is
a violation of the section 12 due process requirement.25 The rea-
sonableness test also finds its basis in many decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in construing the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.26
In 1969, the court had before it the question of whether sec-
tion 1 protected motorcyclists from the forced wearing of helmets
in State v. Odegaard.2 ' The defendant, who was charged with vio-
lating the mandatory helmet law, argued that the statute violated
sections 1 and 12 of the North Dakota Constitution.28 The justices
reviewed similar cases decided by other courts, and adopted the
standard applied by the Michigan Court of Appeals in American
Motorcycle Association v. Davids,29 but reached the opposite
result. In Odegaard, the supreme court discussed American
Motorcycle Association and noted that "[tjhat court applying the
maxim stated by John Stuart Mill that 'the individual is not
accountable to society for his actions, insofar as these concern the
interests of no person but himself,' held the Michigan statute
unconstitutional. "30
The Michigan Court of Appeals had analyzed the motorcycle
helmet law and stated, "[t]het est of legitimacy of the exercise of
the police power is 'the existence of a real and substantial rela-
tionship between the exercise of those powers in a particular man-
ner in a given case and the public health, safety, morals, or the
25. See State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 918 (1943).
26. See United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); N.D. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v.
N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 152 (N.D. 1974).
27. 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969).
28. State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677, 678 (N.D. 1969).
29. 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968).
30. State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969Xquoting American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968)).
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general welfare.' ",31 Applying that standard, the Michigan Court
concluded that the helmet law had no "relationship to the public
health, safety and welfare [and therefore required] the invalida-
tion of [the] statute.
3 2
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court did not adopt the
same conclusion as was reached by the Michigan court, it did
adopt the "real and substantial relationship" test and found that
there was "a real and substantial relationship between the exercise
of the police powers contained in our crash helmet statute and the
public health, safety, and welfare."' 33 The court then concluded
that the statute in no way violated any of the provisions of the state
and federal constitutions.34
The North Dakota Supreme Court did not indicate whether
its conclusion in Odegaard was predicated upon any part of sec-
tion 1, section 12, or both. It therefore remains unclear whether
riding a motorcycle with or without a helmet is an "inherent
right" or a "liberty" interest. It's acquiescence with American
Motorcycle Association, however, indicates that the court acknowl-
edges the existence of a certain personal autonomy which the gov-
ernment cannot arbitrarily infringe upon unless there is a "real
and substantial relationship" between the statutory requirement
and the public health, safety and welfare. This is evidently a step
toward the recognition that section 1 does protect some substan-
tial rights, such as one's personal autonomy, whether considered as
one of the "inherent rights of mankind" or as a "liberty" interest,
and that the government must show the existence of a "real and
substantial relationship" between any infringement thereon and
the public welfare. 5
31. American Motorcycle Ass'n, 158 N.W.2d at 76 (emphasis added) (quoting Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Detroit v. Village of Orchard Lake, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952).
32. American Motorcycle Ass'n, 158 N.W.2d at 77.
33. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d at 680. In Odegaard, the court discussed the "real and
substantial relations" test and referred to State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 920-21 (1943)
for statement of a similar test by this court. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d at 680. State v.
Cromwell does indeed refer to the "real and substantial relation test" but the court applied
the "reasonableness test" because of its belief that the licensing of photographers could not
even pass that test. See State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 920-21 (1943).
34. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d at 680.
35. Following the decision in State v. Odegaard, the legislature amended section 39-
10.2-06 of the North Dakota Century Code to require only those under the age of 18 to
wear helmets. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10.2-06 (1977). In Halvorson v. Voeller, 336
N.W.2d 118, 122 n.3 (N.D. 1983) the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that in
amending section 39-10.2-06 of the North Dakota Century Code the legislature had
determined "that an individual 18 years of age or over should be permitted to decide
whether or not to wear protective headgear." The court in Halvorson agreed with the
legislature's determination, but did not indicate whether its acquiescence was a result of
one's constitutional right of personal autonomy within article I, sections 1 and 12 of the
Constitution. Halvorson, 336 N.W.2d at 119-23.
496 [Vol. 65:491
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
The United States Supreme Court has followed a similar path
in its interpretation of the word "liberty" in the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. That Court,
however, places the burden upon the government to prove a com-
pelling state interest and to narrowly tailor the laws to serve that
interest.36
B. SECTION 2.
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is
instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people,
and they have a right to alter or reform the same whenever the
public good may require.
3 7
Section 2, which contains the basic philosophy of a democratic
government, is also a confirmation that "sovereignty inheres in the
people." 38 Article IV creates the legislature and places the legisla-
tive power of the people in the hands of a legislative assembly. 9
Section 2 of Article I, and Article III, however, reserve to the peo-
ple the power to initiate laws as well as to refer to themselves for
the approval or disapproval of laws enacted by the legislature.4 0
In discussing the meaning of section 2, the court has stated:
The words of section 2 have the deepest significance;
the words have such a profound meaning, and are such a
lucid revealment of the place where political power is
lodged for the benefit of the people, as should make a
vivid impression on the minds of all. Each generation of
people inherit this great and far-reaching political power
from the preceding generation. As an inheriting genera-
tion, it is part of their birthright to receive such power; to
protect it with all their intelligence; to preserve it; to
enjoy it, and hand it down to the future generation, to
posterity, unimpaired."
The people in the exercise of their sovereign power adopted a
Constitution which transfers some, but not all, of their sovereignty
to others, who act as their agents. As stated by the court, "[T]he
Constitution is the means employed by the sovereign people to
36. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
499 (1977).
37. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 2.
38. See State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 133 N.W. 1046, 1048 (1911).
39. See N.D. CONST. art. IV.
40. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. III.
41. See State ex rel Twitchell v. Hall, 171 N.W. 213, 214-15 (1919).
1990] 497
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limit the powers of their agents, especially those of the legislative
department. 
42
That the legislative power remains in the people has been
confirmed many times by the acknowledgement that:
(t)he state Constitution is a limitation, not a grant of
power; it is, in this respect, fundamentally different from
the federal Constitution, which is a grant of power to the
* federal government. The state Legislature therefore has
full power of legislation except as limited by the federal
or the state Constitution .... Though the people have
reserved legislative power, the representative character
of the government is fully retained.43
Section 2 was applied by the court in State ex rel Brunette v.
Sutton,44 as a basis for limiting the power of a County Commission-
ers Board in processing applications for incorporating villages.45
Noting that "(t)he theory on which our system of government is
predicated is that all political power is inherent in the people"
46
the court held that the Board had little discretion in incorporating
matters if the citizens had complied with the statutory
requirements.47
C. SECTION 3.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference shall be forever
guaranteed in this state, and no person shall be rendered incompe-
tent to bea witness or juror on account of his opinion on matters of
religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall
not be construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify prac-
tices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.48
Section 3 protects the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
belief. It qualifies that freedom by stating that "the liberty of con-
science hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts
of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this state."
49
The issue of whether the right to free exercise of religion pro-
42. State v. Schultz, 174 N.W. 81, 83 (1919).
43. See Baird v. Burke County, 205 N.W. 17, 20 (N.D. 1925).
44. 3 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1946).
45. State ex rel. Brunette v. Sutton, 3 N.W.2d 106, 111-13, (N.D. 1942).
46. Id. at 111.
47. Id.
48. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3.
49. Id.
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tects a parent from criminal prosecution for not complying with
compulsory school attendance laws has been before the North
Dakota Supreme Court on six occasions.5 0 In all of these cases, the
compulsory attendance laws were upheld as outweighing any free
exercise right. In five of the cases the court relied upon the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution in reaching its
conclusion.5'
In the sixth case, State v. Rivinius,52 the decision was based on
both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 3 of the North Dakota Constitution. 3
When relying upon the First Amendment, the court has fol-
lowed the analysis used by the United States Supreme Court in
Wisconsin v. Yoder.54
The three-pronged analysis in Yoder involved a
determination of (1) whether or not the activity inter-
fered with by the state is motivated by and rooted in a
legitimate and sincerely-held religious belief, 406 U.S. at
215-216... ; (2) whether or not the parties' (the Amish)
free exercise of religion had been burdened by the regu-
lation, and the extent or impact on their religious prac-
tices, Id. at 217-219,. . .; and (3) whether or not the state
had a compelling interest in the regulation which justified
the burden on the free exercise of religion and overrode
the interest of the Amish parents in exercising their reli-
gious practices. Id. at 221,..... We will apply the consti-
tutional analysis and approach utilized in Yoder in the
instant case.55
In Rivinius, the court, in referring to Article 1, Section 3
stated that the section "is in harmony with the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution."56 The court further concluded:
This illustrates that the interest of the state and the
50. See State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980); State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220
(N.D. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631 (N.D. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986); State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 491 (1988); State v. Melin, 428 N.W.2d 227 (N.D. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 367 (1988); and State v. Toman, 436 N.w.2d 10 (N.D. 1989).
51. See Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 888; Patzer, 382 N.W.2d at 634; Anderson, 427 N.W.2d
at 322; Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 231; Toman, 436 N.W.2d at 11.
52. 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D. 1982).
53. State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220,229 (N.D. 1982). See U.S. CONST. amend. 1; N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 3.
54. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
55. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 891. For the same analysis of Wisconsin v. Yoder, see Patzer,
382 N.W.2d at 634; Anderson, 427 N.W.2d at 322; and Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 231-32.
56. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d at 229.
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interests of individuals regarding their religious beliefs or
convictions must be harmonized and balanced with the
interests of the state so as to preserve the separate inter-
est as much as possible without infringing upon the
respective rights more than is necessary. The interests of
neither one is absolute. We believe the stated constitu-
tional mandate and objective establishes the compelling
state interest and out balances the resulting strain or
imposition on the defendants' religious beliefs. Under the
posture of this case we have available to us no other viable
alternatives.
5 7
Although these cases deal specifically with the balance
between compulsory school attendance and one's free exercise of
religion, they shed light upon the question of what approach sec-
tion 3 mandates in other cases involving state infringement upon
religious freedom. In Rivinius, the court acknowledged that sec-
tion 3 is in harmony with the First Amendment.58 It therefore
seems safe to predict that the court will adopt the United States
Supreme Court's balancing approach used in Yoder in deciding
similar free exercise cases.
As noted above, section 3 does not contain an establishment
clause. It was, however, raised as a defense in State v. Barnes,59
against conviction under a state law making it "unlawful to keep
open or to run or permit the running of any theater,... upon the
first day of the week, commonly called the Sabbath.
60
The court seemed at first to indicate that it need not pass on
the religious question, but then proceeded to discuss at length the
religious significance of the first day of the week. 1 It finally con-
cluded that "(t)he law here in question in no manner interferes
with the religious convictions or scruples of any inhabitant of the
state. It neither prescribes for nor compels the petitioners or
others to observe any form of religious worship. It creates no
establishment of religion. The wills and consciences of all of the
people are left free in this respect."62
The court did not address why the law does not create an
establishment of religion, but it justified the law as being a means
57. Id. at 229.
58. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d at 229.
59. 132 N.W. 215 (1911).
60. State v. Barnes, 132 N.W. 215 (1911).
61. Id. at 216-17.
62. Id. at 218. This is a free exercise argument, not an establishment argument.
500 [Vol. 65:491
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of protecting people in the observance of the first day of the
week13 even though that day may be the Sabbath for a majority of
the people in the state.
The issue of Sunday closing laws was again addressed by the
justices in State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc.64 and City of Bismarck v.
Materi6 1 In Gamble Skogmo the justices followed the United
States Supreme Court decision in McGowan v. Maryland,66 and
found no violation of the First Amendment establishment clause.67
In Materi the legal issue discussed was one of equal protection
under both state and federal Constitutions, and no violation of
equal protection was found.6" In both cases the court refused to
consider section 3 because the defendants failed to allege any vio-
lation of their own right to religious freedom.69
D. SECTION 4.
Every man may freely write, speak and publish his opinions
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege. In
all civil and criminal trials for libel the truth may be given in evi-
dence, and shall be sufficient defense when the matter is published
with good motives and for justifiable ends; and the jury shall have
the same power of giving a general verdict as in other cases; and in
all indictments or informations for libels the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the
court as in other cases.7 °
Although worded differently than the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, section 4 guarantees free speech
and freedom of the press to all persons. Of this section the court
has written that "(f)ew rights guaranteed by the Constitution are
more valuable than those of freedom of speech and liberty of the
press which are guaranteed by the section quoted." 7'
Because section 4 specifically sets forth certain requirements
for libel actions, it was often used in cases early in the State's his-
tory with emphasis being given to the phrase "being responsible
63. Id. at 219.
64. 144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D. 1966). (Alleged violation of a state law.)
65. 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970). (Alleged violation of a city ordinance).
66. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
67. State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749, 769 (N.D. 1966).
68. City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970). In State v. Diamond, 219
N.W. 831 (N.D. 1928), Sunday closing laws were also upheld as against state and federal
equal protection challenges.
69. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d at 769; Materi, 177 N.W.2d at 545.
70. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4.
71. See Englund v. Townley, 174 N.W. 755, 757 (1919).
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for the abuse of that privilege." For example, in McCue v. Equity
Coop. Publishing. Co. of Fargo,72 over the objections of two dis-
senting Justices, the court upheld the overruling of a demurrer to
a complaint for libel.73 The majority wrote:
The right to "freely write, speak and publish his opin-
ions," which is guaranteed to every man by our Constitu-
tion, does not mean unrestrained licenses to publish false
and libelous matter. For while the Constitution makes it
permissive to publish the truth with good motives and for
justifiable ends, it also recognizes the responsibility for
injury to others occasioned by one who abuses the privi-
leges of liberty of speech and the press."4
Justice Robinson took a somewhat different view and wrote,
"[tjhis is a petty libel suit based on the publication of a rather
harmless looking political squib.
' 75
Areas of the federal law of libel not specifically addressed by
the North Dakota Supreme Court when discussing section 4
involve (1) the burden upon public official/public figure plaintiffs
to prove the publication was done with "actual malice" or "with
reckless disregard of the truth, ' 76 (2) the prohibition of imposition
of liability without fault,7 and (3) the possible restrictions on the
allowance of punitive damages.78
Section 4 provides that: "In all civil and criminal trials for
libel . . the jury shall have the same power of giving a general
72. 167 N.W. 225 (1918).
73. McCue v. Equity Co-op Pub. Co. of Fargo, 167 N.W. 225, 231 (1918).
74. Id. at 228.
75. Id. at 231. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the overruling of demurrers
in two other cases. See Englund v. Townley, 174 N.W. 755 (1919); and Meyerle v. Pioneer
Publishing Co., 178 N.W. 792 (1920). In Moritz v. Medical Arts Clinic, P.C., 315 N.W.2d
458, 467 (N.D. 1982), the North Dakota Supreme Court sustained an order of the District
Court dismissing an action for defamation. The majority found that a letter sent to the
plaintiff and seen only by a secretary in the employ of the defendant was not libelous. See
also Little v. Spaeth, 394 N.W.2d 700, 705 (N.D. 1986Xno libel was found in the discharge of
two assistant Attorneys General).
76. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967).
77. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
78. Id. at 345. See also Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985). Section 32-03-07 of the North Dakota Century Code allows for exemplary
damages "when the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or
presumed...." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1976). See, e.g., Skjonsby v. Ness, 221 N.W.2d
70 (N.D. 1974) (exemplary damages allowed in a slander action). In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that under the First Amendment punitive
damages could not be awarded without a finding that the defendant acted with malice, or
with reckless disregard of the truth. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1985). It appears that this rule now
applies only to libel actions involving public officials, public figures and matters of public




verdict as in other cases. ' 7 9 In State v. Tolley,s° the North Dakota
Supreme Court held "the (trial) court is without power in libel
cases to require a special verdict be returned, as the jury is given
the right not only to determine the facts but to apply the law
thereto under the direction of the court as in other cases."
8 1
The issue of peaceful picketing has been before the court on
several occasions.8 2 In Miner v. Building and Construction Trades
Council, 3 the justices held that peaceful picketing which was
done for an illegal purpose "was not protected by the guarantee of
free speech. '8 4 Neither the First Amendment nor section 4 are
cited as authority. The court referred to a Wisconsin case indicat-
ing that peaceful picketing "cannot be made the cover for con-
certed effort against an employer in order to achieve an unlawful
or prohibited object, such as to compel an employer to coerce his
employees to join a union."
8 5
In City of Minot v. General Drivers and Helpers U No. 74,86
and State v. Heath,"7 the court held that peaceful picketing by city
employees and by teachers was illegal.8 8 In Heath striking teach-
ers argued that their picketing was protected by federal and state
constitutions.89 In response to the defendants' argument the court
wrote:
It has been held that the State, in enforcing some
public policy, may constitutionally enjoin picketing aimed
at preventing effectuation of that policy, even where
picketing is against a private employer. 90
Heath is interesting from another point of view. The defend-
ants were subject to a restraining order but chose to ignore it and
picketed anyway.9 1 They were arrested, charged with the viola-
79. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4.
80. 136 N.W. 784 (1912).
81. State v. Tolley, 136 N.W. 784, 788 (1912).
82. See, e.g., Minor v. Building and Construction Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D.
1956); City of Minot v. General Drivers and Helpers Union No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D.
1966); State v. Heath, 177 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1970).
83. 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1956).
84. Miner v. Building and Construction Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1956).
85. Id. at 154 (quoting Retail Clerk's Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
6 N.W.2d 698, 706 (1942).
86. 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1966).
87. 177 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1970).
88. City of Minot v. General Drivers and Helpers U. No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612, 618 (N.D.
1966); State v. Heath, 177 N.W.2d 751, 756 (N.D. 1970).
89. Heath, 177 N.W.2d at 755.
90. Id. at 755 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695, A.F.L. v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1956).
91. Id. at 752.
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tion of the order and were convicted. 92 On appeal they argued
that the restraining order was void because it infringed upon their
right to picket.93 The justices responded by pointing out that, "[i]f
the defendants honestly believed that the trial court's restraining
order was invalid, as they now assert, orderly judicial procedure
would have dictated that they attack the validity of such order by
motion to dissolve it, or by other judicial procedure. But the
defendants did not see fit to follow orderly legal procedure. '94 The
moral of the story is - don't violate a court order even though you
may think it is unconstitutional. You must appeal or suffer the
consequences. 95
In State v. Niska,96 the court addressed the question of
whether section 27-11-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
prohibiting the practice of law without a license was in conflict
with section 4.97 The defendant, who had been charged and con-
victed of practicing law without a license, argued that the law
"violates the first amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sections 4 and 5 of the North Dakota Constitu-
tion."'98 In response, the court noted that "[t]he State's interest in
regulating the practice of law is unrelated to the expression of
ideas" 99 and further, "[tihe statute's incidental restriction on
Niska's freedom of speech is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of the state's interest in protecting the public from unli-
censed practitioners of law."' 00
Except for the court's conclusion that "[s]ection 27-11-01 as
applied to Niska does not violate his right of free speech guaran-
teed by the North Dakota Constitution and by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution"' 0'1 there is
no reference to section 4 nor is there discussion of any North
Dakota cases relating thereto. This may imply that in cases alleg-
ing that a non-speech law is being unconstitutionally applied to a
speaker under section 4, the United States Supreme Court cases
dealing with similar allegations under the First Amendment, will
apply.
92. Id. at 752-53.
93. Id. at 755.
94. Id.
95. For a similar holding by the United States Supreme Court, see Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
96. 380 N.W.2d 646 (N.D. 1986).
97. State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 648 (N.D. 1986).
98. Id. at 648.
99. Id. at 649.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 650.
[Vol. 65:491504
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
The language of section 4 was used as a basis for an argument
that the closing of a preliminary hearing was unconstitutional in
Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen.'0 2 After reviewing a
number of United States Supreme Court decisions and finding that
the United States Constitution gives the press no greater right to
access to judicial proceedings than is given to members of the pub-
lic, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that "[t]he news
media under the North Dakota Constitution does not have any
greater right than it has under the United States Constitution.
Consequently, the opinions of the United States Supreme Court on
this topic have full application in this state."1 3 On this basis, the
North Dakota Supreme Court sustained the trial court's decision
to close the preliminary hearing.'
0 4
The justices recently addressed the constitutionality of closing
a preliminary hearing in Minot Daily News v. Holum. 0 5 Because
the trial court did not adequately articulate the reasons for closure,
the court granted a supervisory writ ordering the trial court to
vacate its closure order and take whatever further action it
deemed appropriate pursuant to the guidelines dictated by the
supreme court.'
0 6
In both Dickinson Newspapers, and Minot Daily News, the
court articulated a standard by which the trial court is to be guided
in making its decision to close a preliminary examination. 10 7 Hav-
ing first noted in Dickinson Newspapers that it "advocate(s) the
policy of openness in judicial proceedings,"' 0 the justices con-
cluded that only if "there is a substantial likelihood that such evi-
dence (evidence inadmissible at trial but admissible at the
preliminary hearing) will interfere with the defendant's right to a
fair trial and impartial jury, then a departure from this policy and
concept will be justified."' 0 9
Following the court's decision in Minot Daily News, the
United States Supreme Court decided Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court."' In Press-Enterprise The Supreme Court held:
(1) "that the qualified First Amendment right to access to criminal
proceedings applies to preliminary hearings as they are conducted
102. 338 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1983).
103. Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgenson, 338 N.W.2d 72, 79 (N.D. 1986).
104. Id. at 81.
105. 380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1986).
106. Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347, 349-50 (N.D. 1986).
107. Dickinson Newspapers, 338 N.W.2d at 79; Minot Daily News, 380 N.W.2d at 349.
108. Dickinson Newspapers, 338 N.W.2d at 79.
109. Id. at 79.
110. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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in California,""' and (2) "the preliminary hearing shall be closed
only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is
a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial
will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and,
second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately pro-
tect the defendant's fair trial rights."'
' 12
In reversing the denial of the preemptory writ, the United
States Supreme Court noted that the California Supreme Court
had "acknowledged, the 'reasonable likelihood' test places a lesser
burden on the defendant than the 'substantial probability' test
which we hold is called for by the First Amendment.""' 3
As previously noted, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
adopted a "substantial likelihood" standard to guide trial courts in
deciding whether or not to close preliminary examinations.
Whether this standard is the same as the United States Supreme
Court's "substantial probability" standard will have to await judi-
cial construction.
In view of the reference in Dickinson Newspapers that the
right of the media under the North Dakota Constitution is the
same as under the United States Constitution, it follows that the
First Amendment right to access articulated in Press-Enterprise is
now part of section 4.
Section 4, when used in conjunction with the First Amend-
ment, has played a part in striking down two sections of the North
Dakota Century Code.1 14 In State v. North Dakota Education
Association,115 the court struck down section 16-20-17.1 of the
North Dakota Century Code which required all political advertise-
ments to disclose the name and address of its sponsor." 16 Although
section 4 was used as a basis for holding the statute unconstitu-
tional, the court relied primarily upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Talley v. California. 117 In Talley, the Court
struck down a Los Angeles city ordinance which prohibited the
distribution of anonymous handbills."" The Supreme Court dis-
cussed the fact that during the period leading up to the Revolu-
tionary War and during the time of the adoption of the
111. Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986).
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id.
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-17.1 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-04 (1981).
115. 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978).
116. State v. N.D. Edue. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 736 (N.D. 1978).
117. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
118. Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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Constitution, much literature was distributed without identifying
the author or distributor because of the fear of reprisal from the
British Crown.' 19
In North Dakota Education Association, the court recognized
that the sponsor of section 16-20-17.1 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code undoubtedly had good motives because of the frequent
use of smear campaign material.12 0 The court stated:
Anyone who has been victimized by anonymous
smears will understand the motives of the sponsors. But
constitutional imperatives must prevail and our hopes
must be in the good sense and decency of the electorate,
or in the passage of a more carefully drawn statute
designed to meet the specific evil.
1 2 1
The specific evil to which the court refers would be the distri-
bution of campaign material which would attack the personal
character or political actions of a candidate.
Two Justices dissented, however, concluding that while the
statute would be unconstitutional as applied to "measures," it
should be upheld as applied to candidates.' 2 2 As stated by Justice
Sand:
The need for anonymity under our laws is not as
great as it was at the time of the pre-independence of our
Nation. Also, the people have a right to know who is
sponsoring and supporting or opposing which candidate if
they are going to make public statements about the candi-
date. This is part of our election process.
123
Section 16-20-17.1 of the North Dakota Century Code has
been repealed and replaced by Section 16.1-10-04.1.124 Section
16.1-10-04.1 requires disclosure only for political advertisements
"designed to assist, injure, or defeat the candidate by reflecting
upon the candidate's personal character or political action,.."..2
In a second election case, Snortland v. Crawford,126 the court
struck down section 16-20-04 of the North Dakota Century Code
119. Id. at 64-65.
120. N.D. Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d at 736.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 741
123. Id.
124. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04.1 (1983).
125. Id.
126. 306 N.W.2d 614 (N.D. 1981).
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again as a violation of section 4 and the First Amendment. 127 This
section limited candidates' campaign expenditures to the greater
of $500 or 15% of the annual salary of the office for which the
candidate was running.
In its analysis of this legislation, the court reviewed Buckley v.
Valeo, 128 a case wherein the United States Supreme Court held
that campaign expenditures impact free speech values.' 29 In
deciding that section 16-20-04 of the North Dakota Century Code
violated the candidates' free speech rights, the court wrote:
Section 16-20-04 is unconstitutional as violative of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 4, of the North Dakota
Constitution because it imposes as substantial restraint
upon the ability of a candidate, such as Crawford, to
engage in protected expression and imposes arbitrary
restraints upon campaign expenditures. 3 °
E. SECTION 5.
The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble
together for the common good, and to apply to those invested with
the powers of government for the redress of grievances, or for
other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.
13 1
Without reference to Article I, Section 5 of the North Dakota
Constitution, the court, in State v. Heath,3 2 discussed the rights of
free speech and freedom of assembly as those rights relate to pick-
eting.' 33 As previously noted, Heath deals with the consequences
resulting from a violation of a court order. It does, however, indi-
cate a recognition that peaceful picketing is within the protection
of the right of "freedom of assembly."' 3 4
The issue of one's right of assembly was also addressed in State
v. Niska.' 35 In that case, the court held that section 27-11-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code dealing with the unlicensed practice
of law "does not violate Niska's right of assembly protected under
the North Dakota Constitution or the First and Fourteenth
127. Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614, 627 (N.D. 1981).
128. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
129. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
130. Snortland, 306 N.W.2d at 627.
131. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 5.
132. 177 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1970).
133. State v. Heath, 177 N.W.2d 751, 755 (N.D. 1970).
134. Id. at 756.
135. 380 N.W.2d 646 (N.D. 1986).
[Vol. 65:491508
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
Amendments of the United States Constitution.' ' 36
Under section 5 of the North Dakota Constitution, "citizens
have a right... to apply to those invested with the powers of gov-
ernment for the redress of grievances... by... remonstrance.' '1 37
The justices analyzed this right in State v. Haugen.138 In Haugen,
several defendants were charged, tried and convicted of threaten-
ing public officials in violation of section 12.1-12-06(2Xb) of the
North Dakota Century Code.139 The defendants, in protesting the
loss of their land, sent a letter to the County Commissioners.140
The letter, entitled "RE: CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AND
DEMAND," included a statement to the effect that "'[i]f you fail
to implement good faith restitution within ten (10) days from this
Notice it will result in Civil and Criminal process to commence
against you for DAMAGES.' 141
In deciding whether the defendants had violated section 12.1-
12-06(2Xb) of the North Dakota Century Code, the court referred
to the application of the First Amendment and Article I, Section 5
of the North Dakota Constitution to communications alleged to be
threatening.' 42 It stated that "in accordance with its legislative his-
tory, the First Amendment, and our state constitutional provision
guaranteeing the right of the people to apply to public officials for
redress of grievances by remonstrance, we conclude that the
defendants' 'Constructive Notice and Demand' letter do not fall
within the proscription of the statute.'
' 43
F. SECTION 7.
Every citizen of this state shall be free to obtain employment
wherever possible, and any person, corporation, or agent thereof,
maliciously interfering or hindering in any way, any citizen from
obtaining or enjoying employment already obtained, from any
other corporation or person, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor. 144
Section 7 was analyzed by the court in Siegal v. Marcus.145 In
136. State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 650 (N.D. 1986).
137. See State v. Haugen, 392 N.W.2d 799, 804 (N.D. 1986).
138. State v. Haugen, 392 N.W.2d 799, 800 (N.D. 1986).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 800-01.
142. Id. at 803.
143. Id. at 804-05.
144. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 7. (Section 6 which deals with the question of slavery, is
obsolete.)
145. 119 N.W. 358 (1909).
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this case, the plaintiff and defendant were partners in a second-
hand clothing, jewelry and pawnbroker business.' 46 As a result of
the dissolution of the partnership, the plaintiff continued to oper-
ate the business and the defendant agreed not to engage in the
same business for two years.' 47 When the defendant took a job as
manager of a similar business the plaintiff brought an action
against him.' 48 Among the defenses asserted by the defendant was
that enforcement of the contract violated section 7 of the North
Dakota Constitution. 49 The court responded to the defendant's
argument by stating: "We think such contention devoid of merit.
Such constitutional provision is not applicable to the facts in this
case and was not intended to abolish the long and well established
rule recognized by the foregoing authorities and others too
numerous to mention."' 50 The court's ruling in Siegal reiterates
the well-established rule that convenants not to compete are valid.
In Minor v. Building and Construction Trades Council,151 and
Ficek v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers,1 52 section 7 was used
as authority for sustaining the State's Right to Work Law.'5 3 In
Minor the District Court granted an injunction against certain
unions and their officers from picketing their employers in an
attempt to force the employers to establish a union shop.'5 4 Citing
section 7 as its authority the court sustained the Right to Work
Law. 15 Because, under North Dakota laws, both closed and union
shops are prohibited, the picketing in support thereof was ille-
gal.' 5 6 Hence, the injunction was valid.
157
The facts in Ficek differ from those in Minor, but the court
similarly held that the Right to Work Law was constitutional under
section 7 of the North Dakota Constitution.158 In Ficek the plain-
tiffs, non-union members, worked for an organization which had
entered into a contract with a union providing for an "agency
146. Siegal v. Marcus, 18 N.D. 214, 119 N.W. 358 (1909).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 359.
149. Id. at 360.
150. Id.
151. 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1956).
152. 219 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1974).
153. Minor v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 139, (N.D. 1956); Ficek
v. Int'l. Bhd. of Boilermakers, 219 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1974). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-
14 (1987). For Declaration of Public Policy relating to workers being free to associate or not
to associate with fellow employees, see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-08-02 and 34-09-01.
154. Minor, 75 N.W.2d at 150.
155. Id. at 141.
156. Id. at 149.
157. Id.
158. Ficek v. International Bhd. of Boilmakers, 219 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1974).
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shop" and union dues "check-off.' 1 59 The court referred to its
decision in Minor and concluded that the Right to Work Law pro-
hibited both the "agency shop" and the union dues "check-off.'
160
In Gottschalck v. Shepperd,16 1 the plaintiff sought to rely
upon section 7 as a basis for claiming that the President of the
State Agricultural College (now North Dakota State University)
"maliciously induced the board of administration to dismiss the
plaintiff, and that by so doing he was guilty of a misdemeanor."'1 6
2
The complaint did not allege that the plaintiff was a citizen of the
United States or a citizen of the state, and therefore section 7 was
not applicable because "such [a] citizen is the only one protected
by section 23 (now section 7) of the state Constitution.' 1 63
G. SECTION 9.
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by
due process of law, and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such
manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the legislative assem-
bly may, by law, direct. 64
1. The Original Philosophy of Section 9.
The court commented on the purpose of section 9 and wrote
that it "has generally been construed not to prohibit the imposi-
tion of reasonable court costs, and was aimed rather against the
selling of justice by magistrates themselves, that is to say, bribery,
than the imposition of reasonable fees.'
'1 65
More recently, section 9 has become more of an affirmative
mandate for open courts rather than just a provision to prevent
bribery.
2. Access - generally.
In Andrews v. O'Hearn,166 the plaintiffs/appellants sought to
use affidavits from jurors stating "that the jurors disregarded the
159. Id. at 861.
160. Id.
161. 260 N.W. 573 (N.D. 1935).
162. Gottschalck v. Shepperd, 260 N.W. 573, 576 (N.D. 1935).
163. Id.
164. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. Section 8 is not addressed in this article. It deals with the
criminal justice system.
165. Malin v. La Moure County, 145 N.W. 582, 586 (1914).
166. 387 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1986).
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court's instructions on'proximate cause and instead relied on their
own improper definition of proximate cause."' 67 Among the argu-
ments asserted by appellants was that the affidavits required con-
sideration under the due process provision of the North Dakota
Constitution, Article 1, Section 9.168
In responding to this argument, the court first noted that sec-
tion 9 "has been repeatedly construed as a guarantee of access to
our State system of justice." '169 It then concluded that even if sec-
tion 9 was to be a repository of some substantive rights, it was not
"an absolute right.' 70  It further noted that "this court, has on
occasion, used this provision of the North Dakota Constitution to
correct substantive error."'17' The court refused, however, to use
the affidavits to impeach the verdict of the jury.17 2
The history of section 9 does not justify the expanded role
assigned to it by the court in Andrews. It is true, as the court
noted, that section 9 contains the statement "every man for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due process of law."173 An analysis of the cases cited by
the court indicates, however, that when referring to due process
in those cases, the court either: (1) does not cite any constitutional
provision, 7 4 or (2) cites section 12 which requires that "[n]o per-
son... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law,"' ' or (3) the case doesn't deal with due process.' 7 1
The reference to due process in section 9 seems more to bol-
ster the "open courts" requirement than it does to be a repository
of substantive due process. It reads that when there has been
injury there shall be a "remedy by due process of law.' 1 77 That
167. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 718 (N.D. 1986).
168. Id. at 723. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9.




173. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9.
174. See, e.g., Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, (N.D. 1978); Trustee Loan Co. v.
Botz, 164 N.W. 14 (1917) (section 9 referred to only in Syllabus); In Interest of W.M.V. 268
N.W.2d 781, 784 (N.D. 1978) (section 9 referred to only in Headnote); State v. Frazier, 167
N.W. 510 (1918); Northern Pacific Ry Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 73 N.W.2d 348 (N.D.
1955).
175. See, e.g., State v. Watland, 201 N.W. 680, 684 (1924).
176. See, e.g., Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432, (N.D. 1957); Divide County v.
Baird, 212 N.W. 236 (N.D. 1927); Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 178 N.W. 792, (1920); Ferch
v. Housing Authority of Cass County, 59 N.W.2d 849, (N.D. 1953); Northern Pacific Railroad
v. State, 299 N.W. 696 (N.D. 1941); Ethan v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, 244 N.W. 32 (N.D. 1932); Crandall v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, 207 N.W. 551 (N.D. 1926); Stockwell v. Crawford, 130 N.W. 225 (1911).
177. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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remedy, of course, would be available in a system where the courts
were open.
This does not mean that substantive due process is not alive
and well in North Dakota. In Arneson v. Olson, 78 the court stated
that, "North Dakota has never renounced substantive due process
as a constitutional standard,....-179 To support this statement, the
court cited Johnson v. Hassett, I ° and Johnson v. Elkin.""'
In Hassett the court struck down the North Dakota Guest
Law. 18 2 While the due process clause in section 12 of article I is
referred to, it plays no significant part in the decision because of
the court's conclusion that the guest law makes improper classifi-
cations and therefore violates the equal protection provision of the
Constitution. 1
83
The due process clause of section 12 was at issue inJohnson v.
Elkin.184 In Elkin the court held that there was no violation of
section 12 in the licensing of house movers.' 8 5 The court reiter-
ated that "(i)n state courts substantive due process in economic




In Hanson v. Williams County,1 87 the court addressed the
constitutionality of a statute of repose barring recovery for per-
sonal injury from a defective product.18 8 The statute in question
barred personal injury recovery resulting from a defective product
unless brought within ten years of the use of the product or eleven
years from the date it was manufactured. 8 9 The plaintiff argued,
among other things, that the statute violated section 9.190 The
majority dismissed this argument and referred to Andrews v.
O'Hearn, for the proposition that section 9 "had never been inter-
178. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
179. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978).
180. 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974).
181. 263 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1978).
182. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 780 (N.D. 1978); See N.D. CENT. CODE ch.
39-15 (1987).
183. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d at 780.
184. 263 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1978).
185. Johnson v. Elkin, 263 N.W.2d 123, 129 (N.D. 1978).
186. Id. at 128. See also Synder's Drug Store, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Ph., 219
N.W.2d 140, 150-51 (N.D. 1974) (wherein the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld, as
against a section 12 due process challenge, section 43-15-35.5 of the North Dakota Century
Code which requires the majority of stock of a pharmacy operated by a corporation to be
owned by a registered pharmacist).
187. 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986).
188. Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, (N.D. 1986). See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 21-01.1-02 (1987). "A statute of repose," the supreme court stated, "terminates any right
of action after a specific time has elapsed regardless of whether or not there has been an
injury." Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 321.
189. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 320. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 21-01.1-02 (1989).
190. Id. at 322-23.
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preted by this court to be an absolute right."' 91 The court, how-
ever, held that the statute violated the equal protection provision
of article I, section 21, and was therefore unconstitutional.
192
In dissent, Chief Justice Erickstad discussed section 9's appli-
cation to plaintiff's claims.' 93 Although, ultimately reaching the
same conclusion as the majority, Chief Justice Erickstad indicated
that section 9 should not be used to create a cause of action where
one is barred by the legislature. 194 He specifically noted:
I do not believe Article I, Section 9 should be used to
guarantee a court-created remedy under any and all cir-
cumstances. When the legislature has specifically abol-
ished or limited a cause of action, we should not use
Article I, Section 9 to recreate the cause of action. 195
As noted in Andrews v. O'Hearn, section 9 has been construed
to guarantee access to our State system of justice.' 96 The access
referred to in Andrews not only means access by litigants, but
access by the general public, including the media.
In KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe,197 two radio stations sought
access to a state's attorney's inquiries into facts surrounding a
death.'9 8 The district court granted plaintiffs' request, perma-
nently enjoining the state's attorney "from denying the Plaintiffs
or members of the general public from access to any State's Attor-
ney's inquiry."'199
The court affirmed the district court's holding and discussed
section 9 as follows:
Thus, the provision in Article I, Section 22 [now Sec-
tion 9] of the Constitution of North Dakota which states
that "all courts shall be open" stands for the proposition
that officers of the courts, along with jurors, witnesses, liti-
gants, and the general public have the right of admission
to court proceedings.2 °°
A state's attorney's inquiry, the court indicated, "is clearly
connected with the functions of a court even though its primary
191. Id. at 322 n.5 (citing Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1986)).
192. Id. at 328.
193. Id. at 332-33.
194. Id. at 333.
195. Id.
196. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 723 (N.D. 1986).
197. 298 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1980).
198. KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1980).
199. Id. at 507.
200. id. at 511.
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purpose is investigatory in nature. ' 20 1 As stated by the court such
access by the public, however, is not absolute.
A literal interpretation of Article I, Section 22 [now
Section 9] of the Constitution of North Dakota would
wreak havoc with established judicial practices in that it
would allow public access to all phases of the administra-
tion of justice, including chambers' conferences, plea bar-
gaining and settlement conferences, adoption
proceedings, those juvenile proceedings presently closed,
grand jury proceedings, and appellate court
conferences. 2
The fact that section 9 may not be much of a guarantee of
access by the public to courts was foreshadowed because, as the
court pointed out, its decision "to open the state's attorney's
inquiry to the public is based upon the absence of legislation which
requires that the inquiry be closed to the public.
20 3
The subtle hint came true three years after KFGO Radio in
Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen.2 °4 The court then
addressed the question of whether section 9 required a prelimi-
nary hearing for a criminal defendant to be open to the press.20 5
The court distinguished Dickinson Newspapers from KFGO Radio
by noting that the holding in KFGO Radio did not apply because
the state's attorney's inquiry in KFGO Radio was not "controlled
by a special statute, rule, or provision such as applied to the instant
case authorizing the exclusion of all but certain persons. "206 "Fur-
thermore, in KFGO Radio, [the court] recognized that the right of
access to judicial proceedings was limited by the constitutional
right to a fair trial.
'2 7
While section 9 was a significant factor in KFGO Radio, it
played no role in Dickinson Newspapers. In KFGO Radio the
court said that "[t]he state's attorney's inquiry is within the scope
of the provision of Section 22 [now section 9] of the Constitution of
North Dakota which states that all courts shall be open."208 In
Dickinson Newspapers, however, the court reached a somewhat
different conclusion. It there held:
201. Id. at 510.
202. Id. at 513.
203. id. at 514 (Pederson, J., specially concurring).
204. 338 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1983).
205. Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgenson, 338 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1983).
206. Id. at 75-76.
207. Id. at 76.
208. KFGO Radio, Inc., 298 N.W.2d at 510.
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A preliminary examination not being a trial or pre-
trial proceeding, the North Dakota constitutional provi-
sions found in Section 9, Article I, providing that all courts
shall be open (accessible for redress), and the Sixth
Amendment [of the United States Constitution] do not
apply with the same force and effect as they apply to
trials.2 °9
When the court in Minot Daily News articulated the "impor-
tant societal interests [which] are advanced by open court pro-
ceedings, '2 0 and set forth guidelines for "proper procedure to be
followed in their considerations of motions to close preliminary
examinations, ' 211 no reference was made to section 9. The court
did, however, recognize that possible First Amendment interests
were involved.21 2
3. Access for Indian Civil Jurisdiction.
The subject of Indian Civil Jurisdiction has been addressed by
the court on numerous occasions. Its history, however, as Justice
Meschke indicated has been "somewhat erratic.
213
In 1957, the court relied upon section 9 in Vermillion v. Spot-
ted Elk,2 1 4 and upheld state court jurisdiction over an automobile
accident on an Indian reservation where both parties were
Indians.2 15
In 1963 the Legislature, acting under the authority of section
203 of the North Dakota Constitution, disclaimed jurisdiction over
civil actions arising on a reservation unless the jurisdiction was
accepted by the Tribe or the individual Indian.2 16 This dis-
claimer/acceptance legislation was used by the court to uphold
dismissal of an action to terminate parental rights in In re
Whiteshield21 7 without consideration of section 9.
"The effect of this legislation," the court stated, "is to com-
pletely disclaim State jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising
on an Indian reservation unless the Indians themselves have acted
209. Dickinson Newspapers, Inc., 338 N.W.2d at 75.
210. Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347, 349 n.3. (N.D. 1986).
211. Id. at 349.
212. Id. at 350. (for a discussion of the applicability of freedom of the press to court
proceedings, see the analyzation of section 4, supra.)
213. See McKenzie County Social Services Board, S.N.F. v. V.G., 392 N.W.2d 399, 401
(N.D. 1986).
214. 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957).
215. Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432, 438 (N.D. 1957).
216. See N.D. CENT. CODE Chap. 29-19 (1989).
217. 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963).
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to accept jurisdiction in the manner provided by the statute. '2 18
The Indian Civil Jurisdiction legislation wac ,addressed by the
justices again in Gourneau v. Smith.2 1 9 The court held that
because the Indians had not accepted state jurisdiction, the state
courts were not open to adjudicate a case involving an auto acci-
dent between Indians that occurred on the reservation.2 ° In
response to a section 9 argument that all courts be open, the court
concluded that "[o]nly the Congress can take from the Indians




Three Affiliated Tribes, etc. v. Wold Engineering, P.C.,222
(Three Tribes I) involved whether an Indian Tribe which had not
voted to accept state jurisdiction could maintain an action in state
court against a non-Indian defendant. 2 3 The court held that there
was no state court jurisdiction.2 24 Section 9 was not raised as an
argument for jurisdiction, and therefore played no part in the
decision. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court this deci-
sion was reversed and remanded for further consideration. 2 5
The United States Supreme Court held that federal law did
not forbid the exercise of state jurisdiction unless the Tribe con-
sented.226 It stated that to allow Indians to sue non-Indians for
matters arising on the reservation would not interfere with the
Indians, rights to govern themselves.227 Further, the Court indi-
cated that it "repeatedly has approved the exercise of jurisdiction
by state courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even
218. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694, 698 (N.D. 1963). State court jurisdiction has
been held not to exist in numerous cases without reference to section 9. See, e.g., White
Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1973); Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812
(N.D. 1975); Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980); and United States, ex rel.
Hall v. Hanson, 303 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1981). In Airvator, Inc. v. Turtle Mountain
Manufacturing Co., the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a state court had
jurisdiction over a corporation even though 51% of its stockholders were Indian. Airvator,
Inc., 329 N.W.2d 596, 604 (N.D. 1983). There is no reference to section 9 in this case. Id.
219. 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
220. Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256, 259 (N.D. 1973).
221. Id. at 259. See also Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975) (accident
occurred on a reservation between a non-Indian and an Indian, and the Indian, but not the
Tribe, consented to jurisdiction); Rollette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645, 648 (N.D.
1974) (Indians have the right to sue non-Indians in State courts). But see Three Affiliated
Tribes, etc., v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 321 N.W.2d 510,512, n.1 (N.D. 1982) (the statement
regarding Indians having a right to sue non-Indians in state court does not apply if the
subject matter of the action arose within the exterior boundaries of a reservation).
222. 321 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1982).
223. Three Affiliated Tribes, etc. v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 321 N.W.2d 510, (N.D.
1982) (hereinafter Three Tribes 1).
224. Id. at 513. 0
225. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138 (1984).
226. Id. at 148.
227. Id.
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when those claims arose in Indian country. 228
The United States Supreme Court remanded the case to give
the North Dakota Supreme Court an opportunity to consider
whether state courts were without jurisdiction because of state
law.2
29
On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Three Tribes
II considered whether it would be a violation of section 9 not to
allow jurisdiction.23 ° In acknowledging section 9's application, the
court concluded that:
As for Article I, Section 9 the courts are open to Affili-
ated providing it complies with Section 27-19-05. True,
Affiliated will become subject to the court upon compli-
ance with that section, but no more so than the defend-
ants Wold Engineering and Schmidt, Smith and Rush.2 3 t
The court held that if there was any residuary jurisdiction
under Vermillion allowing Indians to sue non-Indians in state
court, that jurisdiction terminated by the enactment of chapter
27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code.232
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the holding in
Three Tribes II was also reversed.233 In particular, the United
States Supreme Court noted:
Our consideration of the State's interest in disclaim-
ing the pre-existing, unconditional jurisdiction extended
to tribal Indians suing non-Indian defendants, and in
replacing it with an extension of jurisdiction conditioned
on the Tribe's waiver of its sovereign immunity and its
agreement to the application of state law in all suits to
which it is a party, reinforces our conclusion that Chapter
27-19 is inconsistent with federal law. Simply put, the
state's interest, as presently implemented, is unduly bur-
densome on the federal and tribal interests.2 3 4
What concerned the United States Supreme Court was that
the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of chapter 27-
228. Id.
229. Id. at 159.
230. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold'Engineering, P.C., 364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1985)
(hereinafter Three Tribes 11).
231. Id. at 104.
232. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1989).
233. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (Three
Tribes II).
234. Id. at 887-88.
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19 put the Tribe in an untenable position.23 The United States
Supreme Court indicated that the North Dakota courts were the
only avenue available to the Tribe to obtain an enforceable judg-
ment.236 Yet, to secure such a judgment, the Tribe had to give up
its sovereign immunity and submit to state laws.237 This, The
Court concluded, was "an unacceptably high price to tribal sover-
eignty and thus operate to effectively bar the Tribe from the
courts. ' 238 The federal law therefore pre-empted state jurisdic-
tional rules.239
Upon remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court vacated its
judgment in Three Tribes II and remanded to the district court for
trial.240
Whether the final chapter has been written with regard to
Indian Civil Jurisdiction is questionable. In two recent cases the
North Dakota Supreme Court has held (1) that the district court
did not have jurisdiction to determine paternity where the parties
were Indians and the actions giving rise to the paternity claim
arose on the reservation,2 4 1 and (2) the adjudication of custody and
support matters in a divorce action between a non-Indian and an
Indian residing on the reservation should be left to the tribal
court.2 4 2
In summation, for those actions between Indians dealing with
conduct on the reservation, jurisdiction may be extended only
with the consent of the Tribe pursuant to chapter 27-19 of the
North Dakota Century Code.243 Actions by Indians against non-
Indians for actions occurring on the reservation may be main-
tained in state courts without surrender of Indian sovereignty.
244
To extend jurisdiction over claims by non-Indians against Indians
would impermissibly intrude on tribal self-government.245
It is apparent that the United States Supreme Court is willing
to permit some recourse by a non-Indian defendant in an action by
an Indian even to the extent of allowing a counterclaim to be
235. Id. at 888.
236. Id. at 889.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 893.
240. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 392 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1986)
(hereinafter Three Tribes III).
241. See McKenzie County Social Services Board, S.N.F. v. V.G., 392 N.W.2d 399 (N.D.
1986) cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987).
242. Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1988).
243. See, e.g., McKenzie County Social Services Board, 392 N.W.2d at 402.
244. Id. at 402. See also Three Tribes 11, 476 U.S. at 888.
245. See Three Tribes 1, 467 U.S. at 148; Three Tribes 11, 476 U.S. at 880.
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brought arising out of the same transaction in the main action.246
However, the Tribe cannot be forced to "open itself up to coercive
jurisdiction of state courts for all matters occurring on the reserva-
tion,. . . [because such a] statute invites potentially severe impair-
ment of the authority of tribal government, its courts, and its
laws."
247
Even though the North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged
that its decisions denying jurisdiction to Indians worked a hardship
upon some litigants, 2 48 section 9 has not played a significant role in
the resolution of this issue.
4. Compulsory Arbitration.
Sections 24-02-26 through 24-02-33 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code provide for compulsory arbitration of controversies aris-
ing out of contracts for repair of highways entered into with the
State Highway Commissioner. 249 Those sections were attacked as
being unconstitutional by the Commissioner in Hjelle v. Sornsin
Construction Company.
250
In Hjelle one of the Commissioner's constitutional arguments
was that the compulsory arbitration code sections violated article
I, section 9.251 Although the court acknowledged the Commis-
sioner's argument by citing section 9, the court did not discuss its
effect upon the code sections referred to.252 It first held that the
Commissioner did not have standing because he had no constitu-
tional right to assert.253 The court then distinguished several ency-
clopedia citations made by the Commissioner and ultimately held:
None of these citations is applicable to the instant
case. Accordingly, we see nothing in the provisions of the
state or federal constitutions referred to as prohibiting the
arbitration statutes in question, which require the deter-
mination by arbitration of disputes arising out of highway
construction and repair contracts between the State and a
prime contractor.254
246. Three Tribes 11, 476 U.S. at 881.
247. Id. at 891.
248. See, e.g., Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54, 58 (N.D. 1975).
249. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 24-02-26 to -33 (1978).
250. 173 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 1970).
251. Hjelle v. Sornsin Constr. Co., 173 N.W.2d 431, 434 (N.D. 1970).
252. Id. at 435-36.
253. Id. at 435.
254. Id. at 437.
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H. MISCELLANEOUS SECTION 9 CASES.
1. Allowance of Fees and Costs.
Rule 38 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Practice
allows an appellate court to award "just damages and single or
double costs including reasonable attorney's fees" if it determines
an appeal is frivolous.255 Acting under this authority the North
Dakota Supreme Court has awarded such costs and fees in several
cases.
25 6
In Williams v. State,257 the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
sidered the effect of section 9's requirement of open access to
courts upon the issue of granting fees and costs under Rule 38.258
The court acknowledged that "[o]pen access to the courts is a val-
ued asset in our democratic form of government. '259 It further
noted that counsel and their clients should be permitted to pres-
ent and argue issues even if it is extremely unlikely they will win
on appeal.26 ° Punitive sanctions under Rule 38, the court noted,
"should be utilized with the effect that such sanctions have on the
concept of open access to the courts, but with a recognition that
sanctions must be imposed when an appeal is frivolous and inter-
feres with the proper administration of justice. Appeals must have
some legitimate basis in fact and law."1
261
2. Actions Against the State.
Section 9 authorizes the legislature to waive the state's sover-
eignty immunity. 6 2 The legislature has done this by enacting sec-
tion 32-12-02 of the North Dakota Century Code. 263 Section 32-12-
02 allows actions against the state in only two situations: (1)
"respecting the title to property," and (2) "arising upon a
contract. "264
In Kristensen v. Strinden,2 65 the court held that a civil rights
255. N.D. R. App. P. 38.
256. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Preusse, 358 N.W.2d 511, 514 (N.D. 1984); Martinson v.
Raugutt, 372 N.W.2d 893 (N.D. 1985).
257. 405 N.W.2d 615 (N.D. 1987).
258. Williams v. State, 405 N.W.2d 615, 624-25 (N.D. 1987).
259. Id. at 624.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 625. As previously noted, section 9 is no bar to the levying of reasonable
court costs and fees. See, e.g., Gange v. Clerk of Burleigh Cty. D. Court, 429 N.W.2d 429
(N.D. 1988) (court refused to consider whether a $50 fee required for filing a petition for
dissolution of marriage violated section 9 because this question was not presented to the
trial court).
262. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9.
263. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12-02 (1976).
264. Id.
265. 343 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1983).
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action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Registrar of the North
Dakota Department of Motor Vehicles in his official capacity was
an action against the state and therefore not one of the situations
in which an action is permitted under section 32-12-02.266 The
courts are open, however, to entertain 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions in
other situations. The court commented on the application of sec-
tion 9 to section 1983 actions and wrote that "[o]ur Constitution
does not permit State courts any discretion in determining
whether or not to entertain actions properly brought before
them.
26 7
Whether section 32-12-02 is a bar to the court abrogating state
governmental immunity was addressed in Senger v. Hulstrand
Cons. Co., Inc.268 Prior to Senger the court had held that section 9
"did not preclude the abrogation of governmental immunity, i.e.,
immunity for school districts, and other governmental subdivi-
sions. ' 269 However, because section 9 specifically addresses state
governmental immunity, the court concluded:
We construe Article I, Section 9, of the North Dakota
Constitution as a delegation to the Legislature of the
power to regulate the State's amenability to suit and not
as an invitation to the court to invade that domain.2
3. No Estoppel to Access.
The court again referred to section 9 in Divide County v.
Baird27 1 when a bank pledged its assets as security for a deposit
made by a county.272 It held that the receiver of the bank was not
estopped from recovering possession of the assets.27 3 Because the
deposit arrangement was unlawful, the county argued that the
court had to leave the parties where they found them, i.e., without
court intervention.2 74 The court indicated that just to state the
position should be sufficient to demonstrate its utterly untenable
character and that such a holding would be a confession of judicial
impotence to which it was not prepared to subscribe.
'27
-
266. Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d 67, 74 (N.D. 1983).
267. Id. at 71.
268. 320 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1982).
269. Senger v. HuIstrand Constr. Co., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 507, 509 (N.D. 1982).
270. Id. at 510. For a critical analysis of governmental immunity, see Dickinson Public
School District v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 910-12 (N.D. 1988).
271. 212 N.W. 236 (N.D. 1926).
272. Divide County v. Baird, 212 N.W. 236, 244 (N.D. 1926).
273. Id. at 244.
274. Id. at 243.




1. The Presumptive Validity Rule.
In its approach to the constitutionality of statutes the court
long ago wrote that "[i]t is a well-settled principle of constitutional
law that a law enacted by the Legislature is presumed to be consti-
tutional, unless it is shown that it is manifestly violative of the
organic law." 276 This rule has been restated in cases far too numer-
ous to mention. The rule has, however, undergone some linguistic
changes over the years that should be noted. In City of Fargo v.
Fahrlander 7 the court stated that one asserting the unconstitu-
tionality of a statute "must overcome the well established pre-
sumption that every statute enacted by the Legislature is
constitutional. ' 278 A more recent statement of the rule indicates
that "[a] statute enjoys a conclusive presumption of constitutional-
ity unless it is clearly shown that it contravenes the state or federal
constitutions."
279
Most of the cases quoting this rule have dealt with statutes
relating to economic or social matters. Such statutes, in order to
be constitutional, need only be reasonable and not arbitrary. 8 °
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a similar rule
when dealing with such issues. That Court has stated:
It is by now well established that legislative Acts
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come
to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and
that the burden is on one complaining of a due process
violation to establish that the legislature acted in an arbi-
trary and irrational way.281
The same test applies when there is an attack upon legislation
as being violative of the Equal Protection Clause.282 However, the
United States Supreme Court has also stated that not all legislation
is entitled to the same presumption of validity.283 The presump-
tion is not present when a State has enacted legislation where the
purpose is "to create classes based upon racial criteria, since racial
276. O'Laughlin v. Carlson, 152 N.W. 675, 677 (1915).
277. 199 N.W.2d 30 (N.D. 1972).
278. City of Fargo v. Fahrlander, 199 N.W.2d 30, 33 (N.D. 1972).
279. Richter v. Jones, 378 N.W.2d 209, 211 (N.D. 1985).
280. See, e.g., So. Valley Grain Dealers Ass'n v. Board of City Comm'rs, 257 N.W.2d
425, 435 (N.D. 1977); State ex rel. Hjelle v. A Motor Vehicle, etc., 299 N.W.2d 557, 562
(N.D. 1980).
281. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
282. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
283. Id. at 351.
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classifications, in a constitutional sense, are inherently 'sus-
pect.' 284 Furthermore, "the presumption of statutory validity
may also be undermined when a State has enacted legislation cre-
ating classes based upon certain other immutable human attrib-
utes," such as one's national origin, one's disabilities or one's
gender.28 5
As early as 1938 the United States Supreme Court recognized
that the presumption of validity of economic legislation may be
narrower when dealing with First Amendment issues. 8 6 For
instance in United States v. Caroline Products,2 s7 the supreme
court noted that:
[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Consti-
tution, such as those of the first amendment, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth.28 8
Since 1938, however, the United States Supreme Court has
moved away from the presumption of validity rule when it has
been dealing with fundamental rights, and has adopted more strin-
gent tests, placing a greater burden upon the government to sus-
tain its legislation.289
Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that its application of the presumptive rule is different from
that of the United States Supreme Court.2 0 In State ex rel Olson
v. W.R. G. Enterprises,291 the North Dakota Supreme Court quoted
the federal rule as follows:
Although duly enacted provisions normally enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality, the rule is not applicable
where there is a question of improper infringement of the
exercise of First Amendment rights." (Citation
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
287. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
288. United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
289. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better Environment, 444 U.S.
620, 634 (1980Xoverbreadth test); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966Xclosely scrutinized test); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (heavy
presumption against constitutionality test); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)
(narrowly drawn and compelling interest test).
290. See State ex. rel. Olson v. W.R.G. Enterprises, 314 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1982).




The North Dakota Supreme Court even with its presumption
of validity rule that a statute which limited fees paid to profes-
sional fundraisers, was unconstitutional under the first
amendment.293
In Snortland v. Crawford294 the court, after restating its pre-
sumption of validity rule, again found unconstitutional a statute
limiting the money a candidate could spend for campaign pur-
poses to $500 or 15% of the salary of the office being sought.295
The court relied upon the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Buckley v. Valeo,296 that "[t]he fundamental First Amendment
interests of Crawford at stake here requires that the restrictions
imposed by Section 16-20-04 be subjected to closest scrutiny. "297
The court applied the presumptive validity rule without dis-
tinguishing between legislation involving economic and social
matters and laws infringing upon a right protected under Article I
Declaration of Rights. 98 This application in conjunction with arti-
cle XI, section 4, which requires the concurrence of four justices to
declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional, places a substan-
tial burden upon those who seek to vindicate rights claimed to be
infringed upon by legislative action.
The fact that the rights in the Declaration were placed in the
first article of the constitution articulates their importance in the
North Dakota constitutional scheme.
Thus it would seem that legislation infringing thereon ought
to be presumptively unconstitutional and the state should bear the
burden of justifying such infringement. This is the approach taken
by the United States Supreme Court.
292. Id. at 845-46 (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971)).
293. See W.R.G. Enterprises, 314 N.W.2d at 850.
294. 306 N.W.2d 614 (N.D. 1981).
295. Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614,627 (N.D. 1981).
296. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
297. Snortland, 306 N.W.2d at 627.
298. See, e.g., State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 472 (N.D. 1982) (recoupment of
fees and costs in a criminal case claimed to violate equal protection and due process);
Richter v. Jones, 378 N.W.2d 209, 211 (N.D. 1985) (two mile radius between apiaries
claimed to violate equal protection); City of Fargo v. Fahrlander, 199 N.W.2d 30, 33 (N.D.
1972) (eminent domain); State ex rel. Olson v. W.R.G. Enterprises, 314 N.W.2d 842,845
(N.D. 1982) (speech); Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614, 626 (N.D. 1981) (speech);
State v. Hegg, 410 N.W.2d 152, 154 (N.D. 1987) (right to have a jury of 12 members); and
Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Company, 332 N.W.2d 54, 61 (N.D. 1983) (statutory
provision for cancellation of a distributorship claimed to violate impairment of contracts,
due process and special privileges and immunities); Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511, 513
(N.D. 1982) (equal protection); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 324 (N.D.
1986) (equal protection).
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2. The Heavy Artillery Rule.
Lawyers challenging the constitutionality of a law must take
heed of the "heavy artillery" rule enunciated by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in South Valley Grain Dealer's v. Board of City
Commissioners.299 As noted by the court,
One who attacks a statute on constitutional grounds
defended as that statute is by a strong presumption of
constitutionality, should bring up his heavy artillery or
forego the attack entirely.3 °°
After evaluating the appellant's constitutional arguments, the
court articulated its reason for the "heavy artillery" rule as follows:
The otherwise-well-done brief of the appellant is deficient
in that it argues those propositions only with general
statements and fails to cite any case law, with the sole
exception, that it cites Stanley v. Department of Conser-
vation and Development, (citations omitted) in support of
the second proposition. The attorney for the appellee
provides us with even less help he ignores the constitu-
tional arguments entirely.30 '
The North Dakota Supreme Court realized the necessity for
the rule because of the practice of some lawyers to raise constitu-
tional issues "without any citations or supportive reasoning. "302
The court has implicitly stressed the importance of the rule by the
number of times it has referred to it.
30 3
In bringing up their "heavy artillery," lawyers should be
aware that the North Dakota Constitution is part of that "heavy
artillery." The North Dakota Constitution has a force of its own,
separate and distinct from the United States Constitution. As
299. 257 N.W.2d 425 (N.D. 1977).
300. South Valley Grain Dealers v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 257 N.W.2d 425,434 (N.D.
1977).
301. Id. at 433-34.
302. See State v. Hagstrom, 274 N.W.2d 197, 200 (N.D. 1979); Jones v. North Dakota
Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 334 N.W.2d 188, 192 (N.D. 1983); Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales
and Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 344 (N.D. 1984); Matter of Annexation of Part of
Donnybrook Pub. School, Dist. No. 24, 365 N.W.2d 514, 524 (N.D. 1985); and Wisdom v.
State of N.D. Real Estate Comm'rs, 403 N.W.2d 19, 22 (N.D. 1987).
303. In addition to the cases cited above, see State v. Ternes, 259 N.W.2d 296, 300
(N.D. 1977); Haugen v. City of Berthold, 267 N.W.2d 198, 199 (N.D. 1978); Caldis v. Board
of Cty. Comm'rs., Grand Forks Cty., 279 N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D. 1979); Stokka v. Cass Cty.
Elec. Coop. Inc., 373 N.W.2d 911, 914 (N.D. 1985); Schwarting v. Schwarting, 354 N.W.2d
706, 710 (N.D. 1984); City of Minot v. Johnston, 379 N.W.2d 275, 278 (N.D. 1985); State v.
Haugen, 392 N.W.2d 799, 803, n.2 (N.D. 1986) and Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. P.S.C., 413
N.W.2d 308, 313, n. 4 (N.D. 1987).
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pointed out in Johnson v. Hassett,30 4 "it cannot be doubted that
the power of this court to examine challenges based on the State
Constitution and to decide them has been regularly invoked and
regularly exercised, even during the period when the Federal
courts were not doing so.
' 305
Further, the role of a state supreme court is greater than the
role of the United States Supreme Court on State constitutional
issues.
Federal courts examine State statutes only to deter-
mine if they comply with the United States constitutional
mandates, and we as a State court examine them for that
purpose and also to determine if they comply with State
constitutional mandates, which may be different from
Federal mandates.3 °6
The North Dakota Court has pointed out that "[i]t is within
the power of this court to apply higher constitutional standards
than are required of the States by the Federal Constitution.
30 7
While most of the cases containing the above statement are
criminal cases, a state, if it wishes to do so, may grant greater rights
to its citizens under the Declaration of Rights than accorded by
the United States Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.30 8
304. 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974).
305. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 776 (N.D. 1974).
306. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d
140, 146-47 (N.D. 1974).
307. See State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90, 99 (N.D. 1974). State v. Stockert, 245
N.W.2d 266, 271 (N.D. 1976); State v. Klodt, 298 N.W.2d 783, 786 (N.D. 1980); State v.
Nordquist, 309 N.W.2d 109, 113 (N.D. 1981); City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760,
766 (N.D. 1984); State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 374 (N.D. 1985) (Levine, J.,
Concurring specially); and State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 178, n.6 (N.D. 1985).
308. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1981); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
1990]

